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Research Question/Issue: Existing research suggests that internal and external corporate governance mechanisms substitute
for one another to mitigate agency problems in bidding ﬁrms. This paper tests whether the interaction between these mecha-
nisms is more complementary.
Research Findings/Insights:While there is evidence for disciplinary responses to bids for unrelated targets involving strategic
retrenchment and signiﬁcant asset divestment, the inﬂuence of the information conveyed by this characteristic on the likelihood
of post-abandonment discipline is not ampliﬁed when boards are less independent.
Theoretical/Academic Implications: The results suggest that certain characteristics are used to distinguish between abandoned
bidders which require discipline and those that do not. However, our ﬁndings do not suggest that interaction between internal
and external governance mechanisms is contingent on board independence. Instead, these interactions between shareholders
and boards seem to be contingent on a range of company, industry, and situation-speciﬁc factors.
Practitioner/Policy Implications:While policy in the UK has focused on board independence as a means of effective corporate
governance, our results suggest that this is not a panacea. Effective governance involves active owners, communicating their
interests to boards, and boards responding accordingly. Further encouragement of such communication before, during, and af-
ter acquisitions will improve signals to managers that shareholders can target the necessary discipline of those whom they per-
ceive to need it most.
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Merger and acquisition activity represents an importantmeans of industrial reorganization, ideally delivering
enhanced revenues and/or reduced costs for the ﬁrms
involved. However, acquisition decisions can be a manifesta-
tion of agency problems that arise out of the separation of
ownership and control (Berle & Means, 1932; Jensen &
Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973). Acquisitions are oneway through
which entrenched managers pursue their own preferences at
the expense of shareholders, destroying value in the process.
Attempts to prevent such behavior lie at the heart of much
governance reform in the UK and US over the last two
decades.
Agency theory predicts that dispersed ownership (Chen,
Harford, & Li, 2007; Gaspar, Massa, & Matos, 2005), weak
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2003; Goranova, Alessandri, Brandes, & Dharwadkar, 2007)
provide a governance environment enabling value-destroying
bids. However, even when corporate governance mechanisms
are well-designed, value-destroying bids can still be proposed
(O’Sullivan&Wong, 2005). In such circumstances, the literature
suggests that the bidding process can substitute effective exter-
nal governance mechanisms for weak internal ones, preventing
proposed “value-reducing” bids by powerful, entrenched
managers pursuing their own agenda, from progressing (Lehn
& Zhao, 2006; Paul, 2007). Indeed, according to data from the
Takeover Panel, the organization which regulates acquisitions
in theUK, between 2000 and 2010, on average 10 percent of bids
were abandoned annually at an advanced stage.
Paul (2007: 774) argues that abandonment itself is the ﬁnale
of the disciplinary process, stating that “corrective responses
are unnecessary for terminated bids.” However, is abandon-
ment the disciplinary ﬁnale? Several studies ﬁnd ambiguous
evidence surrounding discipline in bidders after abandoned
bids (see Holl & Pickering, 1988 and Tafﬂer & Holl, 1991).
However, this work is dated and focuses on narrow ﬁnancial
measures of performance after abandonment. The present
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governance mechanisms involving abandoned acquisitions
in the light of conceptual and regulatory developments over
the last 20 years. For instance, Hirshleifer and Thakor (1994)
develop a model whereby internal and external governance
mechanisms interact, not as substitutes, but as complements.
Boards of directors of ﬁrms which are targets of acquisitions
use market signals to improve their knowledge of the
performance of senior managers. Despite abandonment, such
boards discipline the senior managers. Evidence of such
discipline in targets after abandoned acquisitions has been
found by Denis and Serrano (1996) and Limmack (1994).
More recently, corporate governance reform has empha-
sized the role of “independent” directors in monitoring and
disciplining the actions of senior managers, including CEOs.
Several papers have modeled interactions between executive
and independent directors in the context of asymmetric
information (for a survey, see Adams, Hermalin, & Weisbach,
2010). Of particular relevance for the analysis of corporate
acquisitions is the model of Adams and Ferrera (2007). Their
framework provides an explanation for monitoring and
discipline by boards of directors when information is revealed
about the viability of investment decisions.
In this paper, we provide an empirical analysis of the
interactions of internal and external governance mechanisms
surrounding abandoned acquisitions and their aftermath.
Unlike most agency models which look at a limited subset of
relationships, our framework blends existing agency theory
conceptions of internal governance mechanisms surrounding
board monitoring, with ideas about information revelation
through the market for corporate control and managerial
and disciplinary responses to abandonment.
We extend previous work to hypothesize that, in certain
circumstances, internal mechanisms (boards) and external
governance mechanisms (bidding process) interact in a com-
plementary way to discipline senior managers of bidders in
abandoned acquisitions. So, even though managers abandon
a bid driven by their own self-interest, there may still be
further disciplinary reactions by boards of directors to infor-
mation revealed during the bidding process.
The analysis advances existing research into corporate
governance, by incorporating more direct managerial and
disciplinary responses to corporate decisions. Such responses
include organizational restructuring (Haynes, Thompson, &
Wright, 2000; Perry & Shivdasani, 2005), management turn-
over (Huson, Parrino, & Starks, 2001; Kennedy & Limmack,
1996) and ﬁnancial restructuring (Barclay & Smith, 1995), as
well aswhether such bidders become the target of disciplinary
acquisitions themselves (Mitchell & Lehn, 1990). However,
there has been no previous attempt to analyze such responses
to acquisitions and abandonment decisions. Further, this char-
acterization of managerial and disciplinary responses enables
the research to produce novel perspectives by tracing causal
links between them – for instance, CEO replacement can lead
to organizational restructuring involving the unwinding of
their past expansionary investment program.
Our framework incorporates much broader conceptions of
information revelation than previous work, which concen-
trates on narrow interpretations of share price reactions to
bid announcements. Much existing research focuses on the
contribution of factors like ﬁnancing, target relatedness, targetVolume •• Number •• •• 2015management resistance, and the presence of rival bidders to
the likelihood of abandonment itself (see Muehlfeld, Sahib,
& Van Witteloostuijn, 2007). In contrast, we focus on their
informational content, notably the information they may
convey regarding the motives of managers in proposing an
acquisition.
We test the predictions of our hypotheses using a sample of
bidders constructed from abandoned bids in the UK between
1998 and 2008. While many different types of company
abandoned bids during this period, we adopt theoretical
sampling to identify 53 public limited companies (Plcs). These
are joint stock companies, more likely to suffer from the
agency problems that enable self-serving bids by managers
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
Our ﬁndings suggest that bids for unrelated targets increase
the likelihood of signiﬁcant asset divestment and the refocusing
of activities after abandonment. This supports the proposition
that the abandoned bids weremotivated by excessive diversiﬁ-
cation by managers. However, less independent boards do not
accentuate the impact of this characteristic on the likelihood of
strategic changes and signiﬁcant asset divestments. Conse-
quently,while our results imply some sort of governancemech-
anism at work, they do not suggest that board independence is
an important factor determining the extent of discipline.
Instead, internal and external governance mechanisms seem
to interact in a more complex manner.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews
the literature on disciplinary processes in acquisitions and de-
velops a framework explaining the interaction of board compo-
sition and bid characteristics in producing post-abandonment
discipline. We use the framework to propose hypotheses about
the anticipated impact on post-abandonment discipline.
The following section explains the data and research design.
Then, the results are presented and discussed. The ﬁnal
section is the conclusion, including limitations of the cur-
rent research, recommendations for further work and impli-
cations of the study.LITERATURE REVIEWAND HYPOTHESIS
DEVELOPMENT
Agency theory predicts that acquisitions can be amanifestation
of the principal-agent problems proposed by Jensen and
Meckling (1976). In circumstances where there are poorly func-
tioning internal governance mechanisms, entrenched man-
agers may use acquisitions to empire-build (Jensen, 1986) or
diversify their ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk (Amihud & Lev, 1981). This
produces bids which destroy shareholder value. The market
for corporate control is viewed as an external corporate
governance mechanism which substitutes for weak internal
governance, to discipline senior managers for proposing such
bids (Manne, 1965). There is an extensive literature analyzing
the governance role of the acquisition process in alleviating
principal-agent problems (for a review of the literature, see
O’Sullivan & Wong, 2005). It has been proposed that informa-
tion revealed, primarily through share price reactions to bid
announcements, enables the market for corporate control to
distinguish value-enhancing bids in shareholders’ interests
from value-destroying bids in managers’ interests. This sug-
gests some sort of governance mechanism at work. However,© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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2001), research has not fully analyzed the governance mecha-
nisms surrounding abandoned acquisitions, particularly the
nature of the interaction between internal and external gover-
nance mechanisms that may produce abandonment.
Further, existing research concludes that abandonment is
the disciplinary ﬁnale (Paul, 2007). Consequently, there has
been partial analysis of discipline beyond the point of aban-
donment, although some dated work does provide some
limited evidence for managerial and disciplinary responses
to abandonment in bidding ﬁrms. Pickering (1983), for exam-
ple, found mixed consequences for bidding ﬁrms. While the
owners of some bidding ﬁrms took no action against man-
agers in response to abandonment, others responded with a
range of internal actions, such as changing management,
methods of production, or undertaking reviews of products
andmarkets. In some cases, he observed substantial organiza-
tional restructuring. Subsequent work which focused on
ﬁnancial performance in bidders after abandonment found
conﬂicting evidence regarding discipline (Holl & Pickering,
1988; Tafﬂer & Holl, 1991). Beyond these narrow measures
of ﬁnancial performance, there has been little systematic
attempt to analyze the nature and extent of discipline after
abandoned acquisitions or explain why they occur. An analy-
sis is thus timely given the conceptual and empirical develop-
ments in corporate governance since that research was
conducted.
This section will review the literature and construct a novel
framework which blends existing agency theory conceptions
of internal governancemechanisms relating to boardmonitor-
ing, with ideas about information revelation in the bidding
process, to derive testable hypotheses regarding the relation-
ship between the effectiveness of board monitoring, informa-
tion revealed through transaction characteristics, and the
likelihood of post-abandonment discipline. This will extend
knowledge about the nature and effectiveness of interactions
between internal and external governance mechanisms in
preventing acquisitions which destroy shareholder value.
Agency problems tend to arise as a result of the separation of
ownership and control. Where dispersed ownership is likely to
create agency problems, boards of directors are viewed as an
internal governance mechanism to oversee, monitor, and disci-
pline topmanagement, including the CEO (Demb&Neubauer,
1992). In relation to investment decisions, such as acquisitions,
this means that boards should have a role in ensuring that top
management choose value-enhancing acquisitions. Corporate
governance reform has emphasized the extent to which boards
are “independent” of managers. For example, the most recent
revision of the UK Corporate Governance Code (Financial
Reporting Council, 2012: 11) states, “the board should deter-
mine whether the director is independent in character and
judgement and whether there are relationships or circum-
stances which are likely to affect, or could appear to affect,
the director’s judgement.”
The evidence surrounding the effectiveness of board inde-
pendence on ﬁrm performance is mixed. A number of studies
show conﬂicting results (cf. meta-analyses by Bhagat & Black,
2002; Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; Gillette, Noe,
& Starks, 2008 and Tian & Twite, 2011). Indeed, in their model,
Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan (2008) suggest an ambiguous re-
lationship between board independence and their monitoring© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltdof a CEO. They accept that, while independent directors are
more inclined to monitor and discipline senior managers, even
less independent directors may enhance their monitoring of
CEOs in circumstanceswhere their equity-based compensation
is dependent on management performance.
Research suggests that the key aspect regarding the effec-
tiveness of boards involves information asymmetry, where
independent directors have less information than executive
directors and the CEO (Holmstrom, 2005). Certain empirical
ﬁndings provide evidence for this asymmetry. Ravina and
Sapienza (2010) analyze the relative proﬁtability of trades in
ﬁrms’ shares by inside/outside directors. Their ﬁndings show
that insiders do better, suggesting they have better access to
information. Several similar models have been developed
which attempt to explain the process of information transmis-
sion within boards (e.g., Dominguez-Martinez, Swank, &
Visser, 2008; Hermalin &Weisbach, 1998). Adams and Ferrera
(2007) develop a model where CEOs can inﬂuence the
decisions of boards by controlling information released to
independent directors about the viability of investment
decisions. Board independence is an important aspect of the
model, inﬂuencing the CEO’s incentive to share information
about the payoffs from an investment. They demonstrate that,
if boards could take control over decision making in all
circumstances, it is in the CEO’s interest to share the informa-
tion, ensuring only value-enhancing investments are pursued.
The key aspects of the model are the ability of a board to exert
control and the personal cost this imposes on a CEO – they do
not like losing control. Exerting control has a cost for boards,
but this cost falls with greater board independence, as such
boards ﬁnd it easier to confront CEOs and extract the neces-
sary information.
The implication of these models is that more independent
boards should ensure, ex ante, that any takeover bids are
value-enhancing. In such circumstances, abandonment should
not produce disciplinary responses.However, less independent
boards will ﬁnd it more difﬁcult to confront managers, exert
control, and extract full information about the implications of
an acquisition. Consequently, value-destroying bids following
managers’ objectives may be pursued. In such circumstances,
we propose that it takes the additional informational signals
provided through the acquisition process to encourage such
boards to confront managers and exert control. We propose
they force abandonment and discipline the managers subse-
quently. This is the process by which we argue that internal
governance (board monitoring) and external governance
through the acquisition process interact to discipline managers
for proposing value-destroying bids. Consequently, we pro-
pose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Less independent boards increase the likelihood of
post-abandonment discipline.
The release of new information during the bidding process
can have a signiﬁcant impact on the risk and returns associ-
ated with a particular bid and, therefore, on the bid outcome
(Hotchkiss, Qian, & Song, 2005). Implicitly, the nature of the
information revealed can also inﬂuence the response of ﬁrms
to abandonment. It is proposed that negative information
may be revealed about the motives of management. Interpre-
tation of these signals can provide less independent boardsVolume •• Number •• •• 2015
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This should produce discipline of senior management
subsequently.
The share price reaction to bid announcements has been
identiﬁed in the literature on acquisitions as the clearest form
of information revelation, signaling the market’s estimation of
the perceived beneﬁts from an acquisition. Several studies
report that bidders are more likely to abandon proposed
corporate acquisitions when the share price reaction to
announcements is negative (Chen et al., 2007; Luo, 2005;
Masulis, Cong, & Xie, 2009). This suggests that ﬁrms may
“listen to the market” when deciding whether to pursue a
bid. Chang and Suk (1998) distinguish between abandon-
ments initiated by targets and those initiated by bidders. They
found that when targets initiated abandonment, abnormal
returns to bidders were not signiﬁcantly different from zero.
However, when bidders initiated abandonment, the average
abnormal returns were positive, indicating that the market
reacted positively to boards responding appropriately to
information signals.
Further evidence for an informational role for share prices in
corporate governance is found by Lehn and Zhao (2006). They
found that CEOs who complete acquisitions associated with
lower returns around announcement face a higher probability
of being replaced, compared to CEOs who cancel acquisitions
anticipated to reduce shareholder wealth. This suggests a
disciplinary response to poor acquisition decisions; boards
replaced CEOs who failed to respond to market signals. This
tended to be followed by disciplinary restructuring involving
asset divestment. This outcome is supported in a study by
Paul (2007). She found that those who do respond by
abandoning bids keep their jobs. However, there was no
report of what happened after that.
The difﬁculty of interpreting the informational content of
share prices is in discerning the source of the perceived
value-destruction; speciﬁcally managerial self-interest arising
from principal-agent conﬂicts. Therefore, an analysis of the
relationship between the share price reaction to bid announce-
ments and post-abandonment discipline would add evidence
aboutwhether the information signalwas related to perceived
agency problems in the ﬁrm, manifested in the abandoned
bid, or due to other factors. Therefore, the following hypothe-
sis is proposed:
Hypothesis 2. Greater negative share price reactions to bid
announcements increase the likelihood of post-abandonment
discipline.
Further, in our framework, we propose that it is the use of
this information by less independent boards to exert control
which leads to post-abandonment discipline. Consequently,
we can propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2a. Lower board independence will increase the
impact of negative share price reactions to bids on the likelihood
of post-abandonment discipline.
The type of bid ﬁnancing is another transaction characteris-
tic which is used to interpret the motivation for a bid. Bidders
can pay with cash, their own shares, or some combination of
the two. Decisions around ﬁnancing are complex and there
are multiple interpretations, several of which may suggestVolume •• Number •• •• 2015agency problems within a ﬁrm. Jensen (1986) hypothesizes
that senior managers of ﬁrms with insufﬁcient projects with
positive net present values (NPVs), may use excess cash to
pursue value-destroying acquisitions, rather than distribute
the free cash to shareholders. The bids are ﬁnanced by cash
so the senior managers can retain control over resources. Test-
ing this, Gregory (2005) found a signiﬁcant negative relation-
ship between the performance of acquisitions and the extent
of free cash held by bidders.
Another interpretation of the ﬁnancing decision relates to
asymmetric information through uncertainty (Myers &Majluf,
1984): greater uncertainty about the outcome of a bid encour-
ages the use of equity ﬁnancing. Alternatively, directors may
use “share power” (overvalued equity) to acquire assets at an
effective discount (Shleifer & Vishny, 2003). The latter interpre-
tation suggests a resourceful bid to acquire a target cheaply. As
a result of these different conceptualizations, deﬁnitive state-
ments about the relationship between ﬁnancing and abandon-
ment are difﬁcult (O’Sullivan &Wong, 2005). In this study, we
test the proposition that the use of cash signals a value-
destroying bid, which reﬂects directors’ desire to use free cash
ﬂow to retain control over resources. Such information could
be used by boards to force abandonment and instigate disci-
plinary responses subsequently. Conversely, equity bids signal
a value-enhancing bid that is in shareholders’ interests. Thus,
the following hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 3. Higher cash ﬁnancing increases the likelihood of
post-abandonment discipline.
Further, in our framework, we propose that it is the use of
this information by less independent boards to exert control
which leads to post-abandonment discipline. Consequently,
we can propose the following additional hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3a. Lower board independence will increase the impact
of cash ﬁnancing on the likelihood of post-abandonment discipline.
Further information about the motives for a bid can be
derived from the identity of the target. Bids for related targets
are anticipated to produce clearer synergistic beneﬁts, enhanc-
ing shareholder wealth, supporting efﬁciency from economies
of scale and scope as important motives for such acquisitions
(Peltier, 2004). Related acquisitions may also produce beneﬁts
for corporate governance, as it is easier to assess the perfor-
mance of managers in more focused ﬁrms.
Meanwhile, bids for targets in unrelated sectors will not
produce the same level of synergistic beneﬁts – at best related
to ﬁnance, administration, and governance. Further, diversiﬁed
ﬁrms can create corporate governance problems as it is more
difﬁcult to discern managerial performance across an array of
unrelated or limitedly related activities. Such bids may be a
sign of excessive diversiﬁcation arising out of principal-agent
conﬂicts with managers of bidding ﬁrms who are empire-
building or seeking to reduce their personal risk at the expense
of shareholders (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Lane, Cannella, &
Lubatkin, 1998). Hence, unrelated bids may be a sign of
such managerial motives. Markets may signal this informa-
tion to boards, which force abandonment to prevent detri-
mental consequences for shareholder wealth. This should
elicit further discipline afterwards. Therefore, we propose
the following hypothesis:© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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of post-abandonment discipline.
Further, in our framework, we propose that it is the use of
this information by less independent boards to exert control
which leads to post-abandonment discipline. Consequently,
we can propose the following additional hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4a. Lower board independence will increase the
impact of bids for unrelated targets on the likelihood of post-
abandonment discipline.
This review indicates a gap in the literature surrounding the
agency theory of corporate governance and the nature and
extent of discipline, if any, imposed onmanagers surrounding
abandoned acquisitions. In summary, we address this gap by
proposing hypotheses regarding the interaction of internal
governance mechanisms with information revelation in the
bidding process, indicating bids driven by managerial self-
interest arising out of managerial–shareholder conﬂicts.METHOD
Research Design and Sample Selection
The hypotheses are tested cross-sectionally using a sample of
UK companies which have abandoned bids between 1999
and 2008. A cross-sectional design is chosen because it is the
variation across bids, in terms of board monitoring and
transaction characteristics, which will determine differences
in the extent of post-abandonment discipline. Agency theory
proposes joint stock companies are those most likely to have
the principal-agent problems, which give managers the scope
to make “value-reducing” bids (Jensen, 1986). Consequently,
the sample of ﬁrms in the present study is drawn from UK
public limited companies (Plcs). The bids are sourced from
the Takeover Panel – the institution which, under the auspices
of the London Stock Exchange, regulates bids for UK regis-
tered companies. Table 1 shows the chronological distribution
of both the population and the sample over the period.TABLE 1
Annual Number of Abandoned Acquisitions in the UK
Total Sample %
1999 33 6 18.18
2000 25 2 8.00
2001 6 1 16.67
2002 8 3 37.50
2003 12 9 75.00
2004 11 3 27.27
2005 18 5 27.78
2006 13 9 69.23
2007 11 7 63.64
2008 9 8 88.89
146 53 36.30
Source: Panel on Takeovers and Mergers Annual Reports: 1999–2008
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons LtdA total of 146 bids were abandoned, but this includes not
only the UK Plcs desired for the present study, but also UK
private limited companies and foreign bidders. In addition, is-
sues of data availability and companies’ involvement in mul-
tiple abandoned bids reduced the sample for analysis to 53.
Even so, this is 36.3 percent of abandoned bids in the UK over
this time period and is sufﬁcient to be deemed representative
of UK public bidders and abandoned bids over the period.
Data Collection and Variable Measurement
The data for the 53 companies in the sample were collected
from regulatory news statements (required statements under
the listing obligations of the London Stock Exchange), com-
pany press releases, and annual reports. These were sourced
from the London Stock Exchange website or individual com-
pany websites.
The dependent variable is the disciplinary response to
abandonment. There are a variety of disciplinary responses
identiﬁed in the recent corporate governance literature which
could be consequences of interactions between internal and
external corporate governance mechanisms involving bid-
abandonment. In this study, we use several discrete opera-
tional measures of disciplinary responses to abandonment,
which suggest varying degrees of severity (see Table 2 for
operational deﬁnitions of disciplinary responses). These range
from changes in strategic direction and CEO replacement, to
more severe responses involving changes in corporate control
through disciplinary acquisitions.
Firstly, Pickering (1983) found evidence that the abandon-
ment of a bid may lead to strategic changes within ﬁrms. We
propose that such strategic changes are a disciplinary response
to an abandoned bid, arising from principal-agent conﬂict. We
identify strategic changes from appropriate statements in the
sources highlighted above. For instance, one company’s report
stated the abandoned acquisition represented the “closing of
one chapter and the opening of another,” while another’s
annual report highlighted “strategic repositioning” within
months of their abandoned bid.
Secondly, the replacement of senior management, notably
CEOs, is the most common form of disciplinary response
highlighted (Huson et al., 2001). CEO replacement may be a
punishment for proposing acquisitions with poor prospects.
Such replacement is proposed as a possible disciplinary
response to information revealed by an abandoned acquisi-
tion. In identifying CEO replacement as a disciplinary re-
sponse, we ﬁnd evidence linking the event to abandonment.
Traditionally, a time-limit of two years is adopted for such
changes (Kennedy & Limmack, 1996). Any changes after that
are unlikely to be linked with the earlier abandoned bid.
Thirdly, organizational restructuring (Ahn & Walker, 2007),
and particularly asset divestment (Perry & Shivdasani, 2005),
have disciplinary interpretations if CEOs, or their successors,
unwind excessive diversiﬁcation previously conducted. Infor-
mation about this excessive acquisitiveness is revealed during
the bidding process. Abandonment is forced and disciplinary
disposals occur. Firms are deemed to have made signiﬁcant
asset disposals if their real value of net acquisitions (disposals)
is in the lowest quartile for the distribution of this variable
across the cross-section of ﬁrms. In addition, a policy of asset
sales is also evidenced by the analysis of statements inVolume •• Number •• •• 2015
TABLE 2
Operational Measures of Post-Abandonment Events and Determinant of Signiﬁcance
Dimension of discipline Operational measures Determinant of signiﬁcance
Signiﬁcant strategic changes Evidence of announced changes in
strategy within two years
Binary classiﬁcation
Codes used for secondary data: Yes – Discipline
“strategic review” No – No discipline
“new direction,”, “reorientation”
“shareholder activism”
Signiﬁcant management changes Replacement of the chief executive
within two years of abandonment
Binary classiﬁcation
Yes – Discipline
No – No discipline
Signiﬁcant asset sales Total real value of net acquisitions
(disposals) as a percentage of total
assets within three years of abandonment
Binary classiﬁcation
Disciplinary: Asset sales
if company is in ﬁrst quartile
of distribution for sample
No discipline: If company
is in the second, third or fourth
quartiles for distribution
Disciplinary sequence Evidence of announced changes in
strategy and/or CEO replacement
followed by signiﬁcant asset sales
Binary classiﬁcation
Yes – Discipline
No – No discipline
External discipline through the
market for corporate control
Successful bid for company within
3 years of abandoned bid or bankruptcy of
company within 3 years of abandoned bid
Binary classiﬁcation
Yes – Discipline
No – No discipline
6 CORPORATE GOVERNANCEcompany reports and regulatory news announcements. These
relative determinants of signiﬁcance are appropriate because
the focus of the research is distinguishing the experiences of
different bidding ﬁrms, not comparing the experiences of
abandoned bidders with an exogenous control group. This is
consistent with the approach to classiﬁcation taken by Paul
(2007) in her study of completed acquisitions.
In addition to analyzing these disciplinary responses
discretely, we propose tracing causal links between these
events after abandonment to clarify disciplinary processes. If
changes in strategy and/or CEO replacements are followed
by signiﬁcant asset disposals, this suggests that managers are
being disciplined because they pursued excessive diversiﬁca-
tion in the past. Therefore, we include a further operational
measure of post-abandonment discipline where evidence of a
causal link from changes in strategy and/or CEO replacement
to signiﬁcant asset disposals is observed.
Discipline through the market for corporate control is
measured in one of two ways: either changes in control
through a subsequent acquisition or through bankruptcy
within three years of abandonment (Mitchell & Lehn,Volume •• Number •• •• 20151990). A three-year time limit is adopted because any later
events would be less likely to be responses to abandonment
(Powell & Stark, 2005).
The independent variables in each of the hypotheses are
deﬁned as follows. For hypothesis 1, board independence
is operationalized as the proportion of non-executive
directors on the board. This is included as the moderator
variable to test hypotheses 2a, 3a, and 4a. This is the
standard measure adopted in many prior studies (e.g.,
Muth & Donaldson, 1998). It is acknowledged that this is
an imperfect measure, as being a non-executive director
does not imply complete independence. However, for the
sample time period it is difﬁcult to glean ideal information
from published sources.
For hypotheses 2 and 2a, the share price response to bid
announcements is measured using the market model esti-
mates of cumulative abnormal returns from days 1 to + 5.
For hypotheses 3 and 3a, ﬁnancing was measured by the pro-
portion of the offer price ﬁnanced using the bidder’s own eq-
uity, ranging from 0 (complete cash ﬁnancing) to 1 (complete
equity ﬁnancing). Information about bid ﬁnancing was found© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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relatedness between the bidder and the target is measured
using the Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC). We deﬁne
a target as related if it has the same 2-digit SIC as the bidder.
This is consistent with previous studies (e.g., Muehlfeld
et al., 2007). This is a dummy variable which takes a value of
one for a related bid and zero otherwise.
Model
A logit regression model is used to test hypotheses 1, 2, 3, and
4. Separate logit regressions were run for each measure of
post-abandonment discipline – announced changes in strat-
egy, CEO replacement, signiﬁcant asset disposals, and exter-
nal discipline. Further, we include another measure of post-
abandonment discipline, where a causal link from changes
in strategy and/or CEO replacement to signiﬁcant asset dis-
posals is observed. The dependent variable equals one if a
ﬁrm experiences post-abandonment disciplinary responses
as deﬁned above, and zero if it does not. The model includes
control variables for contingent factors in the bidding process
which can inﬂuence abandonment, size, and proﬁtability.
There are a number of factors which can inﬂuence the course
of a bidding process.
The presence of rival bidders, particularly if they are of-
fering cash, tends to generate abandonment related to the
terms of a bid rather than its motives (Kummer & Steger,
2008). Rival bidders are attracted, either by the target as a
“white knight,” or because they want the target’s assets.
Competitive bidding pushes up the price, reducing the op-
portunity for bidders to derive value from a transaction. A
bidder not wishing to overpay may therefore abandon a
bid to avoid the winner’s curse (Roll, 1986). A dummy var-
iable is used which takes a value of one if there is a rival bid-
der(s) and zero otherwise.
Target management resistance is another contingent factor
inﬂuencing abandonment (Branch, Wang, & Yang, 2008;
Muehlfeld et al., 2007). Such resistance is linked to a number
of factors, such as the means of payment and the presence of
rival bids (Kummer & Steger, 2008). Bidders looking to maxi-
mize returns from a transaction may make an opportunistic
bid. Targetmanagersmay resist because they think the bid un-
dervalues their company. Such resistance is in their share-
holders’ interest, as these managers are trying to elicit a
higher price, perhaps by initiating an auction process. A
dummy variable is used which takes a value of one if there
is target management resistance to an initial bid and zero
otherwise.
Size is a control variable measured as the natural logarithm
of the total assets of the bidding ﬁrm at the end of the ﬁnancial
year preceding the bid. Its inclusion is based on the argument
that the size of a ﬁrm can have a major impact on the response
to abandonment, as larger joint stock ﬁrms are more likely to
suffer problems associated with the separation of ownership
and control, but are less likely to be subject to the external dis-
cipline of the market for corporate control. A control variable
reﬂecting the proﬁtability of the bidding ﬁrm is also included.
Poor proﬁtability may worry principals concerned that man-
agers are overstretching themselves with bids, rather than
focusing on the internal restructuring necessary to improve
proﬁtability. We measure proﬁtability using the average© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltdreturn on capital employed over two full ﬁnancial years
preceding the bid. Table 3 shows the shortened names for
the independent variables, their operational deﬁnitions, the
sources of data and their expected signs.
Based on the model, the probability of a bidding ﬁrm
experiencing a post-abandonment disciplinary response is:
eηi = 1þ eηi
 
(1)




Following Aiken and West (1991), we center the indepen-
dent variables to enable a moremeaningful interpretation of
the logit regression results. We choose to center the vari-
ables on their median values as, with the inclusion of sev-
eral dummy variables, no ﬁrm actually possesses the
mean characteristics. As a result, the exponent of the inter-
cept coefﬁcient of the logistic regression of (2) is the pre-
dicted odds of post-abandonment discipline for the
median ﬁrm. Consequently, we can use the “median ﬁrm”
as a benchmark for the calculation of the marginal impact
of the independent variables on the probability of post-
abandonment discipline (Long, 1997).
We propose that less independent boards use additional in-
formation signals from transaction characteristics to exert con-
trol, force abandonment and discipline senior managers
subsequently. Consequently, changes in the proportion of
non-executive directors on the board (PID), holding every-
thing else constant, should change the marginal impact of
the independent variables on post-abandonment discipline.
To test this, we extend the model to include terms measuring
the interaction between board independence and each charac-
teristic anticipated to convey information during the bidding
process. This extended model tests hypotheses 2a, 3a, and
4a, respectively. To denote the interaction terms, I is added
to the independent variable names. This extended model is
shown in equation (3) below:
eηi ¼ β0 þ β1PIDþ β2CARþ β3PEQþ β4RTGTþ β5RIVAL
þβ6TRESþ β7SIZEþ β8PERFþ β9ICAR
þβ10IPEQþ β11IRTGTþ εt
(3)
We test the interactions as a “chunk,” comparing the
goodness-of-ﬁt of the model without the interactive terms
against the model with the interactive terms (Kleinbaum,
1992). We use Hosmer-Lemeshow (H-L) tests to measure the
goodness-of-ﬁt. If the difference in ﬁt is trivial, this suggests
that interactions between PID and information revealed dur-
ing the bidding process are not material to the probability of
post-abandonment discipline. In contrast, a signiﬁcant result
suggests that at least one interaction term is important. If this
is the case, we use a backward elimination strategy to identify
signiﬁcant interactions.We analyze the signiﬁcant interactions
using procedures described by Jaccard (2001). The results are
presented and discussed in the following section.Volume •• Number •• •• 2015
TABLE 4





nnounced changes in strategy 15.1 8
EO replacement 37.7 20
igniﬁcant asset divestments 20.75 11
ubsequent acquisition 9.4 6
ubsequent bankruptcy 11.3 5
isciplinary process 81.8*
irms where signiﬁcant asset sales were
receded by announced changes in
trategy and/or CEO replacement (as a
TABLE 3
Independent Variable Deﬁnitions, Data Sources and Expected Signs
Variable
(Abbreviated name) Deﬁnition Source











Cumulative abnormal returns using market
model residuals through days 1 to +5.
Bloomberg 







Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the







Dummy variable that takes a value of one if








Dummy variable that takes a value of one if
there is target management resistance to an





SIZE Natural logarithm of the total assets of the





PERF Average return on capital employed over two






Disciplinary Responses to Abandonment. Table 4 pro-
vides descriptive statistics for the disciplinary responses for
the sample of 53 failed bidders. The ﬁndings indicate that
37.7 percent experienced no disciplinary responses to abandon-
ment. However, a large percentage of the sample announced a
change in strategy or CEO replacement – indeed, several ﬁrms
did both. Where ﬁrms announced a change in strategy and/or
replaced their CEO, asset disposals were much more likely.
There is a signiﬁcant difference between the incidence of
changes in strategy and/or CEO replacement (81.8 percent) in
ﬁrms experiencing subsequent asset disposals compared to
their incidence (43.4 percent) across the whole sample. This
suggests that asset divestments are more likely to follow an-
nounced changes in strategy, CEO replacement, or both,
supporting the concept of a disciplinary sequence triggered
by information revealed during the bidding process.ercentage of all ﬁrms which have
igniﬁcant asset sales)
ercentage of ﬁrms with signiﬁcant asset
ales in the whole sample
43.4
*denotes that the difference in percentages is signiﬁcant at the 5% level.Determinants of Post-Abandonment Responses. Table 5
reports the descriptive statistics for the entire sample of aban-
doned bidders. The mean sample ﬁrm size was £19648.91m,
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TABLE 5






Non-executive directors (%) (PID) 47.51 50.00
Bid announcement return (%),
(Days 5,+1) (CAR)
-1.31 -1.91
Proportion of equity ﬁnancing
(PEQ)
0.68 1
Target with same 2-digit SIC
(RTGT)
0.81 1




Total assets (£m) (SIZE) 19648.91 140.79
Average return on capital (%)
(PERF)
8.92 6.90
For all dummy variables, the reported numbers in the sample mean
column indicate the proportion of sample ﬁrms that carry a value
“1” for respective variables.
9RESPONSES TO ABANDONED ACQUISITIONS IN BIDDING FIRMSdemonstrating a positive skew for the distribution of this
characteristic.
The correlation matrix for the independent variables is
shown in Table 6. There are no signiﬁcant correlations, sug-
gesting that the ﬁndings of the models are not affected by po-
tential multicollinearity.Logistic Regression Results
The results from implementing variations of the regression
model expressed in equation (2) are presented in Tables 7–11.
We shall discuss the effect of each independent variable on
the probability of experiencing post-abandonment discipline
in the context of ﬁrms possessing median characteristics (the
median ﬁrm hereafter).TABL
Correlation M




RTGT .317 .001 .006
RIVAL .000 .095 .043 -.022
TRES .002 .165 -.185 -.141
SIZE .280 -.143 -.150 .248
PERF .148 -.180 .079 .270
** p< .05
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons LtdThe results show that the odds of the median ﬁrm announc-
ing a change in strategy within two years of abandonment
was only 0.063. The only variable with a signiﬁcant inﬂuence
on this disciplinary outcome is the industrial relatedness of the
target. The median ﬁrm has a related target, but the results in-
dicate that if the bid was for an unrelated target, the odds of
announcing a change in strategy subsequently was 22 times
greater. This supports hypothesis 4, suggesting a signiﬁcant
relationship between unrelated diversiﬁcation and post-
abandonment discipline. This suggests that such bids signal
empire-building by managers and/or the diversiﬁcation of
their personal risk. The results support a governance role for
the bidding process in abandoning such bids andmaking stra-
tegic changes afterwards. The results do not support any of
the remaining hypotheses. Neither board composition (PID)
nor bid ﬁnancing (PEQ)were found to have a signiﬁcant inﬂu-
ence on the probability of changing strategy after abandon-
ment. While, the variable CAR has an odds ratio of 6.548, in
practice, thismeans that a 1 percent decrease in CAR increases
the probability of post-abandonment discipline by only .001.
The results do not support hypotheses 1, 2, or 3 regarding
CEO replacement as a disciplinary response to abandon-
ment. In contrast, the results suggest that bids for unrelated
targets are ﬁve times more likely to produce CEO replace-
ment compared with bids for related targets. This supports
hypothesis 4.
The results indicate that the predicted odds of the median
ﬁrm making signiﬁcant asset disposals after abandonment is
.037. Again, the industrial relatedness of the target has a signif-
icant impact on the probability of this aspect of post-
abandonment discipline. If the value of this variable moves
from 1 (related target) to 0 (unrelated target), the predicted
odds of post-abandonment discipline rises 10-fold. This sup-
ports hypothesis 4, suggesting diversifying bids signal exces-
sive diversiﬁcation by managers. After abandonment, there
is a refocusing of activities. The results do not support any of
the other hypotheses.
In many cases, a causal link can be drawn between
announced changes in strategy and signiﬁcant asset divest-
ment. Similarly, a causal link can be drawn from CEO
replacement to signiﬁcant asset disposals. Indeed, several
ﬁrms in the sample replaced their CEO, announced aE 6
atrix (n = 53)
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TABLE 7
Regression Results for Announced Change in Strategy as Post-Abandonment Discipline






Odds ratio for variable
vs median values
Intercept -2.762 (1.021)*** Median ﬁrm .063
PID -.293 (3.372) PID .085 1.341
CAR -1.880 (3.644) CAR .414 6.549
PEQ .183 (.954) PEQ .053 .833
RTGT -3.100 (1.088)*** RTGT 1.402 22.198
Control variables Control variables
RIVAL -1.255 (.975) RIVAL .222 3.510
TRES .636 (.931) TRES .033 .529
SIZE .132 (.142) SIZE .0554 .877
PERF .317 (1.551) PERF .046 .543
In panel (a) the standard errors are shown in parentheses. In panel (b) predicted odds for independent variables are calculated for 1 unit





Regression Results for CEO Replacement as Post-Abandonment Discipline






Odds ratio for variable
vs median values
Intercept -2.353 (1.079) Median ﬁrm .095
PID 1.289 (1.954) PID .026 .276
CAR 5.284 (5.108) CAR .001 .005
PEQ -.786 (.807) PEQ .209 2.196
RTGT -1.653 (1.524) RTGT .497 5.224
Control variables Control variables
RIVAL -1.529 (.718) RIVAL .437 4.614
TRES -1.308 (.849) TRES .352 3.699
SIZE .123 (.117) SIZE .084 .885
PERF 2.732 (2.484) PERF .006 .065
In panel (a) the standard errors are shown in parentheses. In panel (b) predicted odds for independent variables are calculated for 1 unit




10 CORPORATE GOVERNANCEretrenchment strategy, and made signiﬁcant asset disposals.
We include a measure of post-abandonment discipline that
distinguishes cases where this disciplinary sequence is
established. The results echo those for the regressions with
announced changes in strategy and signiﬁcant assetVolume •• Number •• •• 2015divestments as the dependent variable. This clearly indi-
cates that the industrial relatedness of a target has a signiﬁ-
cant impact on the likelihood of this disciplinary sequence.
A bid for an unrelated target raises the predicted odds of
such disciplinary sequences 18.07 times. Again, this result© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
TABLE 9
Regression Results for Signiﬁcant Divestments as Post-Abandonment Discipline






Odds ratio for variable
vs median values
Intercept -3.309 (1.384)** Median ﬁrm .037
PID -1.165 (2.715) PID .117 3.207
CAR .135 (4.304) CAR .032 .874
PEQ .676 (1.203) PEQ .019 .509
RTGT -2.372 (1.363)* RTGT .392 10.722
Control variables Control variables
RIVAL -2.314 (1.363)* RIVAL .370 10.115
TRES -.216 (1.118) TRES .062 1.707
SIZE .535 (.183) SIZE .045 1.241
PERF -2.205 (4.094) PERF .331 9.068
In panel (a) the standard errors are shown in parentheses. In panel (b) predicted odds for independent variables are calculated for 1 unit





Regression Results for Sequential Process of Post-Abandonment Discipline






Odds ratio for variable
vs median values
Intercept -4.194 (2.038)** Median ﬁrm .015
PID -1.562 (3.245) PID .072 4.767
CAR 3.310 (4.621) CAR .001 .037
PEQ -.005 (1.246) PEQ .015 1.005
RTGT -2.894 (1.654)* RTGT .273 18.067
Control variables Control variables
RIVAL -2.325 (1.711) RIVAL .154 2.146
TRES -.920 (1.410) TRES .038 2.509
SIZE .571 (.182)** SIZE .0267 1.771
PERF -1.516 (4.776) PERF .069 4.552
Notes: In panel (a) the standard errors are shown in parentheses. In panel (b) predicted odds for independent variables are calculated for 1 unit




11RESPONSES TO ABANDONED ACQUISITIONS IN BIDDING FIRMSis consistent with hypothesis 4. In such cases abandonment
seems to be driven by information revealed that bids are
driven by managerial empire-building or diversiﬁcation of
their personal risk, producing discipline through CEO© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltdreplacement, and strategic changes involving retrenchment
and the refocusing of activities.
Interestingly, the median ﬁrm has predicted odds of .410 for
experiencing external changes through corporate andVolume •• Number •• •• 2015
TABLE 11
Regression Results for External Control Events as Post-Abandonment Discipline






Odds ratio for variable
vs median values
Intercept -.893 (.434) Median ﬁrm .410
PID .454 (1.277) PID .260 .635
CAR -2.552 (2.767) CAR .420 1.026
PEQ .689 (.451) PEQ .206 .502
RTGT .066 (.724) RTGT .383 .936
Control variables Control variables
RIVAL -.116 (.389) RIVAL .460 1.123
TRES .727 (.446) TRES .198 .484
SIZE -.145 (.089) SIZE .473 1.156
PERF 1.888 (.893) PERF .062 .151
In panel (a) the standard errors are shown in parentheses. In panel (b) predicted odds for independent variables are calculated for 1 unit




12 CORPORATE GOVERNANCEﬁnancial restructuring in bankruptcy, or through the mar-
ket for corporate control. However, the results do not sup-
port hypotheses 1, 2, 3, and 4. Changes in the independent
variables do not have a signiﬁcant impact on the predicted
odds of experiencing this aspect of post-abandonment
discipline.
In the regressions with asset divestments and disciplinary
sequences as measures of post-abandonment discipline, the
coefﬁcients on the control variable for SIZE are signiﬁcant
and positive. This suggests that the larger a ﬁrm, the higher
the likelihood it will experience disciplinary responses cul-
minating in asset disposals. This is consistent with the argu-
ment that large ﬁrms are more likely to be excessively
diversiﬁed, requiring retrenchment and a refocusing of its
activities.
In addition, the coefﬁcient on the control variable, RI-
VAL, in the regression for asset divestment is signiﬁcant
and negative. With a rival bidder present, abandonment is
likely to be driven by price and not information revelation
related to motives. This is supported by the low predicted
odds for these disciplinary responses for the median ﬁrm.
However, if the value for this variable changes, from 1 (rival
bidder) to 0 (no rival bidder), the predicted odds of post-
abandonment asset divestments increases by a factor of
10. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that,
without a rival bidder, abandonment is more likely to be
driven by information revelation that a bid is driven by
managerial empire-building or diversiﬁcation of personal
risk. Cumulatively, a ﬁrm at the third quartile of corporate
size, making a bid for an unrelated target with no rival bid-
der, is approximately 32 times more likely to conduct signif-
icant asset divestments compared to the median ﬁrm.Volume •• Number •• •• 2015Interactive Terms
In our framework, we propose that less independent boards
will use the additional information signal provided by bid
characteristics to exert control over senior managers to force
abandonment. Consequently, lower board independence
should amplify the impact of bid characteristics on the likeli-
hood of post-abandonment discipline. This is characterized
in hypotheses 2a, 3a, and 4a. To test these hypotheses, we
include interaction terms between PID and CAR, PEQ, and
RTGT, respectively.
Table 12 shows the results of the H-L tests conducted, com-
paring the goodness-of-ﬁt for themodel without, compared to
the model with, interactive terms. The results show that the
addition of interactive terms does not improve the ﬁt of the re-
gression model explaining post-abandonment disciplinary re-
sponses. This does not support the view that reduced board
independence intensiﬁes the impact of bid characteristics on
the likelihood of post-abandonment disciplinary responses.Implications of the Results
The results provide support for the proposition that, in
certain circumstances, the process of abandonment does
play a governance role in bidding ﬁrms, mitigating
principal-agent conﬂicts. Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 are not sup-
ported by the results. This suggests that ﬁrms’ board com-
position, bid ﬁnancing, and the share price reaction to
bids, are not signiﬁcant sources of information regarding
agency conﬂicts in this context. In contrast, our ﬁndings
reveal that the key characteristic driving changes in strategy
and signiﬁcant asset sales is the industrial relatedness of the
bidder and target. This supports hypothesis 4. The results© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
TABLE 12












H-L test statistic without
interactive terms
10.765 (.215) 16.374 (.037)** 5.262 (.729) 2.499 (.962) 7.523 (.481)
H-L test statistic with all
interactive terms
3.932 (.863) 9.137 (.331) 2.912 (.940) 2.634 (.955) 7.166 (.519)




13RESPONSES TO ABANDONED ACQUISITIONS IN BIDDING FIRMSimply that ﬁrms that abandon bids for unrelated targets are
more likely to announce changes in strategy afterwards, in-
volving signiﬁcant net asset sales. Unrelated bids may be
interpreted as a sign of either excessive diversiﬁcation by
bidding managers’ empire-building (Jensen, 1986) or man-
agers’ diversifying their own ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk (Amihud &
Lev, 1981). The disciplinary response is consistent with this
view: a retrenchment of activities after abandonment,
removing non-core, “value-destroying” elements of the
company.
There is no evidence of any interaction between the extent of
board independence and information revealed by bid
characteristics inﬂuencing the extent of post-abandonment
discipline. This does not provide support for the proposed
process whereby less independent boards can use bid charac-
teristics to overcome information asymmetries they face.
Indeed, board independence does not have a signiﬁcant
impact on the likelihood of post-abandonment discipline. This
supports the view of an ambiguous role for board composi-
tion (Kumar & Sivaramakrishnan, 2008).CONCLUSION
Summary
This research has contributed to the literature by (i) extending
the analysis of the governance role of abandoned acquisitions
to the post-abandonment phase, tracing the extent of disciplin-
ary responses in bidding ﬁrms after abandonment and (ii)
examining the relationship between characteristics which indi-
cate agency problems and the degree of post-abandonment dis-
cipline in a UK corporate environment. Seven hypotheses were
developed to test which, if any, agency characteristics reveal
information about bids driven by managerial self-interest and
produce post-abandonment discipline. The hypotheses were
tested using data from a sample of 53 abandoned acquisitions
involving UK publicly listed corporations as bidders.
In certain circumstances, a governance role for the bidding
process surrounding abandoned acquisitions is supported
by the evidence. Corporate governance mechanisms culmi-
nating in internal discipline surrounding asset divestments© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltdand down-sizing seem to be triggered by bids for unrelated
targets. This suggests that principal-agent problems in these
ﬁrms produced excessive diversiﬁcation by executives’
empire-building or diversiﬁcation of personal risk. There is
no evidence that more severe external discipline involving
changes in control (subsequent acquisition or bankruptcy) is
related to board composition or transaction characteristics.Limitations and Further Research
The results are subject to limitations inherent in the research
design in several areas. Despite our sample of bidders in
abandoned takeovers representing a signiﬁcant share of all
such ﬁrms over the sample period, work utilizing a larger
number of bidding ﬁrms could produce additional robustness
to the analysis of the distinctive characteristics of discipline
involving abandoned acquisitions. This is particularly the case
when analyzing the interactions between board independence
and transaction characteristics. Consequently, further research
could re-examine the hypotheses of this study using a larger
sample of bidding ﬁrms. In addition, while we conceptualize
a reasoned elucidation of post-abandonment disciplinary
sequences, this could beneﬁt from additional research. In
particular, future research could develop different proposi-
tions regarding post-abandonment discipline and, by compar-
ing against our results, further enhance our understanding of
the governance mechanisms involving abandoned acquisi-
tions. Furthermore, such work could also be conducted using
abandoned acquisitions in other jurisdictions where the
market for corporate control is anticipated to be an important
corporate governance mechanism such as the US, Canada,
and Australia.Implications of the Study
Divergent shareholders and managers’ interests remain an
important issue for corporate governance in Anglo-American
corporate environments. Our results indicate that the bidding
process of abandoned acquisitions can, in certain circum-
stances, play a governance role addressing problems arising
from agency conﬂicts in ﬁrms. The ﬁndings imply that theVolume •• Number •• •• 2015
14 CORPORATE GOVERNANCEmarket for corporate control can distinguish between aban-
doned bidders which require discipline from those that do
not. This implies that signiﬁcant corporate control events,
such as acquisitions, are important mechanisms through
which information about managerial motivations are re-
vealed. However, the proposed mechanism by which boards
of different composition interpret bid characteristics is not
supported by the results. There is no evidence that weaker
boards respond to bid characteristics differently, producing a
difference in the likelihood of post-abandonment discipline.
This is important given the emphasis on board independence
in regulatory reform surrounding corporate governance. It
suggests that the information is used by boards to decide
whether a bid is worthwhile, not just in isolation, but in the
context of other information. Itmaywell be that board interac-
tions, and their response to the signals of shareholders are
more subtle and complex, governed by a range of factors,
rather than just the independence of directors.
Our results suggest that discipline depends on the nature of
problems arising from the manager–shareholder relationship
identiﬁed. Consequently, larger, excessively diversiﬁed ﬁrms
do not tend to suffer substantial control changes as a result
of bid abandonment. Instead, they remain independent, focus-
ing instead on altering strategy; from expansion to retrench-
ment. So long as boards/agents respond appropriately,
principals are happy to leave them in place. External discipline
through the market for corporate control is not necessary. This
appears to be a manifestation of increased “shareholder activ-
ism” in corporate control. Indeed, the promotion byUK regula-
tors of more regular meetings between companies’ boards of
directors and their major shareholders will improve signals to
managers. This should produce more value-enhancing acquisi-
tion decisions.ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
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